Every year on May 9th, commemorative events are held in big cities across Europe, such as Vienna, Berlin, Frankfurt, and Madrid, among others to mark the “Victory day” – a celebration of the Soviet victory in World War II. The most visible is the Immortal Regiment (“Бессмертный полк”), a procession framed as a peaceful, grassroots tribute to veterans. But despite the familiar visuals of portraits, music, and flowers, this is no neutral act of remembrance.
The Immortal Regiment has become a tool of Russian state propaganda. It glorifies war, promotes authoritarian narratives, and sanitises history. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, allowing this event in the centre of Vienna raises urgent questions.
The Immortal Regiment started in 2012 as a grassroots initiative in Russia to honour WWII veterans. Its original goal was to democratise war memory by focusing on families rather than state heroism. People carried photos of their relatives who fought or died in WWII, shifting the meaning of Victory Day from a military parade to personal grief. But the Russian government quickly co-opted the idea. It turned the movement into a patriotic ritual, exercising control over memory and using it to build nationalistic pride. What began as a grassroots act of remembrance is now a state-led performance used to glorify the war and justify militaristic violence.
In recent years, Immortal Regiment marches have been staged in European capitals under the guidance or outright sponsorship of Russian embassies and state-aligned groups. For example, in Vienna in 2025, the program included a celebratory concert, a march through the city centre, and a closing concert under the official patronage of the Russian Embassy. All featured artists were publicly loyal to Vladimir Putin’s regime, and speeches closely followed official propaganda lines.
On the official website organisers ask participants to avoid using “symbols with Latin letters,” an indirect reference to the “Z” and “V” symbols that are used by Russian army since 2022 full-scale invasion in Ukraine, which later became widespread symbols of state propaganda, war supporters and Russian far right and neo-nazis. At the same time, organisers warn against “Ukrainian ultranationalists” and say they will surveil the event with help from Austrian police.
The message is clear: this is not a peaceful, inclusive event. It’s a state-aligned propaganda performance wrapped in the language of remembrance and “security.”
Commemoration is not neutral
Organisers claim the event has no connection to current politics. But remembrance is never apolitical, especially in authoritarian regimes that weaponise history. Russian “Victory Day” has become a tool for glorifying the state and militarism, and suppressing opposing opinions.
By staging these events abroad , the Russian government positions the USSR (and by extension, today’s Russia) as the sole liberator of Europe, while ignoring Soviet atrocities, invasions, and repression. To commemorate is not the problem. But to commemorate selectively, under Kremlin’s direction, while Russia is waging a war, killing people in Ukraine and torturing political prisoners in Russia is not remembrance. It’s Kremlin’s propaganda.
In Russian national discourse, World War II (or the Great Patriotic War) is the central historical myth underpinning national identity. Victory Day is treated as the most important and sacred celebration of the year, symbolising the very foundation of the modern Russian state.
Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and escalating tensions with Ukraine, this narrative has intensified. In parallel, several post-Soviet states have created museums and research projects grounded in post-colonial perspectives, which question the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, condemn Soviet (and Russian) policies of force, and critically examine the Soviet wartime legacy.
The Kremlin has responded with laws criminalising the “denial of the Nuremberg Tribunal” and the dissemination of so-called “false information” about the USSR’s role in WWII. In this framework, historical interpretation itself becomes a matter of state security.
Vladimir Putin has framed Russia’s “moral obligation” as protecting the memory of the war. In practice, this has meant shifting the focus from acknowledging the war as a violent and traumatic event to celebrating the valour of Soviet soldiers “liberating” Europe from Nazism. This reframing marks a transition from the post-war ideal of “Never again” to the militaristic slogan “We can repeat it” (mozhem povtorit’). Public opinion has followed the state’s lead. Since 2014, surveys have shown rising approval of Joseph Stalin, growing denial of the scale of mass repression, and nostalgia for the Soviet Union’s collapse as a national tragedy. The state’s ambiguous treatment of Stalin’s legacy, combined with its neglect of collective trauma, reveals how it cherry-picks history to build a militarised and exclusionary national identity. The state selectively edits the past to legitimise the present. By controlling memory, it controls who belongs, who is an enemy, and what future is possible.
Events like the Immortal Regiment are not just for Russians living outside the country. They are soft power tools, designed to normalise Russia’s militarised nationalism in foreign cities. They frame Russia as a misunderstood saviour, not an aggressor. They build loyalty among diaspora communities and stoke suspicion toward Ukrainian voices and critics of the war.
Through concerts and marches, history is reframed. And by allowing these state-aligned events to take place, host countries risk becoming silent platforms for authoritarian messaging.
While “Victory Day” in major European cities are being presented as something for the people and by the people – in reality there is a strict censorship and governmental control over the program of the event. Any critique of Putin’s regime or russian government is not tolerated on these events.
No oppositional voices, no anti-war activists or human rights defenders are allowed to be represented on these events. And those russian citizens who are protesting against it are being profiled by Russian secret services which leads to serious safety risks.
Why we must speak up
Historical memory matters. So does who controls it. The “Victory Day” celebration and Immortal Regiment in Europe may not openly promote war, but its ties to the Russian state, its surveillance tactics, and its selective memory tell a different story. In a time of war, silence becomes complicity.
Allowing this event to unfold unchallenged legitimises state-sponsored narratives that erase suffering, justify violence, and fuel aggression.
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